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Introduction
Adequate safeguards against health care fraud are essential to the proper
functioning of any health care system. This analysis examines health care fraud in the
U.S., and its findings underscore the importance to national health reform of
comprehensive anti-fraud protections covering both public and private health insurance
industry.
This analysis examines health care fraud in a national policy context. Its findings
underscore two critical points. First despite strong evidence that fraud is system-wide
and affects the cost of health care in both public and private insurance, national
reporting systems on health care fraud fail to capture private sector fraud. As a result,
current evidence on the scope of fraud fails to present the full magnitude of the problem,
because it tends to focus on public insurance fraud.
Second, existing information on health care fraud tends to conflate evidence of
fraud with evidence of payment errors. While payment errors in public insurance
programs pose a serious problem, the tools for remedying errors differ significantly from
those used to address fraud.
Addressing these challenges in health reform is extremely important, not only
because of the systemic nature of health care fraud but because, with rapid advances in
health information technology, the potential for fraudulent schemes to move rapidly
across all payers grows.
Following a brief overview, the analysis reviews the law and examines ongoing
state and federal government efforts to combat fraud.
Overview
As with any very large enterprise, the U.S. healthcare industry is susceptible to
fraud and abuse in both private and public programs alike. Evidence drawn from fraud
studies suggests that fraud generally tends to disproportionately target vulnerable
populations such as the poor and the elderly. Furthermore, public programs operate
under strict reporting requirements, thereby creating a situation in which the most
commonly available information concerns public programs such as Medicaid and
Medicare. Fraud can be committed by individual consumers and patients, but the most
serious health care fraud is not the result of small schemes, but instead flows from
large-scale misconduct by major industry actors, including insurers and health care
providers and corporate suppliers. The vast majority of fraud prosecutions emanate
from the health care industry itself; indeed, a feature of fraud prosecutions involving
patients can be the exposure of criminal enterprises designed by corrupt health care
providers who in turn induce patients into participating in fraudulent schemes.

In 2007, the U.S. spent nearly $2.3 trillion on health care; that year public and
private insurers processed more than four billion health insurance claims. 1 The National
Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA) has estimated that conservatively, 3% of
all health care spending—or $68 billion—is lost to health care fraud. Other estimates by
government and law enforcement agencies place fraud-related losses as high as 10%
of annual health care expenditures. 2 At this rate, losses to fraud -- over $220 billion in
2007 alone – would be enough to generously support coverage for all uninsured
Americans.
Fraud schemes are not specific to any geographic area and are found throughout
the entire country. 3 Certain types of fraudulent schemes (e.g., stealing patient ID
numbers and falsely billing for care) tend to be more common. Also, it has been found
that consumers are more susceptible to fraud if they are older and/or poor, thus health
care fraud, much like mortgage fraud, would tend to be more common in poorer
communities because of the greater vulnerability of their residents. 4
Certain aspects of health care increase the risk of fraud. Patients’ dependence
on their health care providers may mean that unscrupulous providers can engage in
activities that patients may not understand or to which they may acquiesce without a full
appreciation of the consequences, such as having patients sign forms affirming that
they in fact received care and services never furnished. The sheer volume of insurance
transactions, coupled with their complexity, serves to increase system vulnerability to
fraud. 5
Experts in the field of fraud suggest that health care fraud perpetrators consider
their conduct to be a low-risk crime, with both public and private insurers offering easy
targets. Insurers’ payment operations are geared toward rapidly processing massive
amounts of claims, with a focus on coding, not fraud. 6 Moreover, the commercial
insurance industry itself, as revealed in a recent and widely publicized investigation by
New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, has (not for the first time) used the
complex nature of its own business to commit fraud, in this case by systematically
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underpaying health insurance claims, thereby exposing patients (and providers) to
sizable unreimbursed costs that should have been covered under their plan terms. 7
Even as they improve quality and efficiency, electronic data exchange and other
technological advances can create further fraud exposure. This is because electronic
claims transactions both increase the volume of claims and allow large enterprises to
use technology to engage in fraud while avoiding computer fraud detection systems. 8
Numerous government agencies have found that no segment of the health care
delivery system is immune from fraud, and 9 government investigations have uncovered
fraud in all industry sectors. 10 Indeed, the failure to systematically and routinely
measure the scope of fraud has been reported to be a characteristic of the insurance
industry worldwide. 11
The financial consequences of healthcare fraud are far-reaching. Whether the
health care financing comes from an employer-sponsored plan, the individual market, or
public insurance programs, the health care system as a whole bears the burden of
fraud. Health care fraud translates into higher costs for insurers and consumers alike.
Fraud also leads to reduced benefits or coverage as policies are tightened as a strategy
to avoid fraud. 12 Indeed, it has been reported that the overall rise of health care costs is
in part due to fraud. 13
Because Medicare and Medicaid are government-sponsored programs, efforts to
reduce fraud tend to be more publicly visible, particularly since the federal government
now issues regular reports across all healthcare sectors. But since 1995, 90% of all
private insurers have launched anti-fraud campaigns. 14
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Fraud Defined
In General
Black’s Law Dictionary defines fraud as “a knowing misrepresentation of the truth
or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.”
Improper payments or overpayments may not involve fraud at all if a payment simply
was made or claimed in error, unless an individual knew or should have known that the
claim was erroneous. At its heart, the law equates fraud with an intent to conceal or
deceive, an effort to generate unjust enrichment, or acting in a manner that conveys a
reckless disregard for the truth of one’s claims.
In the context of health insurance, fraud may manifest itself as deceiving a public
or private health insurer into paying claims that are not owed or recklessly submitting
claims. Insurers also, as noted, have been found to have engaged in fraud by
conspiring to overcharge sponsors and plan members in relation to the benefits that
were promised in their contracts. Both provider and insurer fraud are essentially an
intentional manipulation of the claims payment process for financial gain through bribes,
kickbacks, and racketeering. The essence of fraud is concealment, misrepresentation,
mis-stating the truth, withholding information that would allow the truth to be known, or
engaging in practices that will mislead others. A fraudulent representation need not be
the sole inducement to act; the essential dimension is that without the representation,
the injured party would not have acted. 15
Fraud must be distinguished from improper payments under public programs,
which must be publicly reported as a matter of federal law. 16 An improper payment can
arise from simple errors in documentation, coding, reporting, verification, and other
technical matters related to the administration of public programs. Improper payments
are reported annually by federal agencies under the Improper Payment Improvement
Act of 2002 (IPIA). 17 In recent years, as agencies increasingly have implemented the
law, the amount of reported improper payments has risen. Along with better reporting
have come efforts to correct the underlying program administration standards and
procedures that give rise to improper payments.18
Fraud is different because of the knowledge or reckless disregard for truth that is
present. Translating these concepts into examples in health care fraud reveals the
types of practices about which much has been written: Fraud against the Medicare
program happens when hospitals “upcode” their claims in order to get more payment
than their care is worth. Fraud against private health insurers occurs when a physician
files claims for phantom patients by buying lists of Social Security numbers. Fraud
15
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against health plan members happens when an insurer conceals information about what
a service actually costs so that expenses are pushed back onto members or plan
sponsors. Fraud can also occur when a health benefits plan or insurer systematically
denies or delays certain types of claims or rescinds insurance coverage once claims
begin to come in.
In each case, the perpetrators of the fraud are using their superior information –
about the procedures furnished, the patients served, or the true cost of care – to enrich
themselves to the detriment of others. For this reason, insurers and health care
providers alike have been sued using a variety of legal theories, ranging from the
violation of the common law of good faith and fair dealing 19 to general or health care
specific fraud statutes addressing false claims, the most common type of health care
fraud. 20
The Law of Fraud
Common Law Fraud
As noted, the common law (the body of judge-made law that forms the
foundation of the American legal system) classifies as fraud knowingly or recklessly
making false representations or concealing the truth. 21 Liability for fraud depends on
proof that the person committing the fraud knowingly or recklessly has made a
materially false representation with the intent of creating reliance and causing financial
injury. 22
Federal Fraud Laws
A significant body of federal law to address fraud has developed over the past 25
years; a brief overview of such laws is provided here.
Federal False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA imposes liability on a person who
knowingly submits a false claim to obtain federal funds. The United States can
prosecute violators for $5000 to $10,000 per false claim as well as treble damages
(three times the government’s loss). 23
In addition to applying to claims submitted with fraudulent intent 24 , the FCA also
applies to claims submitted with “reckless disregard” 25 or “deliberate ignorance” 26 of
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their falsity. For example, a physician who bills for health care rendered to dozens of
patients in a day – far beyond what a reasonable practice might entail -- is presumed
under the law either to have intentionally filed false claims or to have ordered his
untrained bookkeeper to submit the bills with total disregard for the accuracy of her
work. 27
In addition to allowing the United States to sue on its own behalf, the FCA
permits private persons, referred to as "qui tam plaintiffs" or "relators"—or colloquially,
"whistleblowers"—to sue on the government's behalf as well as their own. 28 The Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 incentivized qui tam litigation by encouraging states to enact
state false claims laws with qui tam provisions for use in Medicaid fraud suits. 29 States
that enact such laws receive a bounty in the form of a 10% reduction in the amount
owed by the state to the federal government in the event of a recovery. In order to
qualify for this special statutory bounty, a state’s law must be a “qualifying” false claims
law. 30
Legislation enacted in 2009, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA), 31
further strengthened the FCA by broadening the range of conduct that can be subject to
false claims prosecution by including the presentment of a false claim (even if not paid)
and the knowing use of false records or statements “material to a false or fraudulent
claim.” 32 In addition, under FERA’s expanded definition of what constitutes a “claim,”
the false invoice or statement no longer must be presented directly to the federal
government in order to establish liability; it is sufficient merely if “the money or property
is to be spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government
program or interest.” 33
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO allows both
criminal and civil prosecution if a “pattern” of criminal activity is found. 34 A pattern
consists of at least two related predicate acts (types of conduct that evidence fraud) that
“amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” 35 The predicate acts must
affect interstate commerce and must be one of the 35 crimes listed in the statute. 36 Mail
and wire fraud (e.g., the electronic submission of fraudulent claims) are the most
common alleged predicate acts. 37 Under RICO, it is unlawful for any person who has
25
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participated directly or indirectly in a pattern of racketeering to use any money derived
from those activities to invest in, acquire, maintain control in, or participate in the
conduct of an “enterprise.” 38
The Anti-Kickback Statute. Codified at §1128B of the Social Security Act, the law
makes it a criminal offense to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit, or receive any
remuneration to induce or reward referrals of items or services reimbursable by a
federal health care program. 39 The definition of remuneration is broad and includes any
kickback, bribe, or rebate. 40 The statute is violated if remuneration is paid purposefully
to induce or reward referrals of items or services payable by a federal health care
program (e.g., if a hospital makes payments to a medical practice to incentivize referrals
of its Medicare business). The statute itself has several exceptions 41 and the
Department of Health and Human Services has promulgated safe-harbor regulations
shielding certain activities such as employment relationships, investment interests,
certain referral services, and other types of payments that are not considered
remuneration for the purpose of the Act. 42
The Stark Statute. Often referred to by the name of the Representative who was
its chief sponsor, the legislation, codified at §1877 of the Social Security Act, was
enacted to “address the strain placed on Medicare Trust fund by the overutilization of
certain medical services by physicians who, for their own financial gain rather than their
patients' medical need, referred patients to entities in which the physicians held a
financial interest.” 43 The Act, which contains certain limitations and exceptions, prohibits
physicians from referring patients to entities that furnish “designated health services"
("DHS") in situations in which there exists a financial relationship between the entity and
the physician or an immediate family member. 44
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). HIPAA
federalized the crime of health care fraud by making it illegal for anyone to knowingly
and willfully defraud any health care benefit program (public or private) or to obtain by
means of false representations any money or property of a health care benefit
program 45 , make false or fictitious statements "in any matter involving a health care
benefit program,” 46 embezzle, convert, or steal any funds, property, or assets of a
health care benefit program, 47 or obstruct, delay, prevent, or mislead the investigation of
federal health care offenses. 48 HIPAA also requires the establishment of the Health
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Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program, which coordinates federal, state, and local law
enforcement programs to control fraud and abuse. 49
Federal Oversight and Administration of Health Care Anti-Fraud Efforts
Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation is the primary investigatory agency
involved in health care fraud, the successful resolution of anti-fraud efforts involves the
combined investigative efforts and resources of the HHS Office of the Inspector General
(OIG), Department of Justice (DOJ), Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCU), and other
law enforcement agencies.
OIG shares enforcement responsibility under the anti-kickback statute with the
DOJ, which prosecutes criminal cases on behalf of the United States. OIG investigates
allegations of illegal kickbacks and works with DOJ and the United States Attorneys to
prosecute criminal cases. In addition, OIG supports DOJ's civil prosecutions under the
False Claims Act. Under joint direction of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services, the national Health Care Fraud and Abuse
Control Program (HCFAC) is designed to coordinate federal, state and local law
enforcement activities with respect to health care fraud. 50 The Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) is also engaged in combating Medicaid provider fraud, waste,
and abuse through the Medicaid Integrity Program (MIP). 51
State Fraud Laws
In addition to common law fraud and general fraud statutes, states have enacted
specific laws aimed at health care fraud, which typically are part of the implementation
of federal law. 52 State fraud laws vary; some are of general application while others
specifically target health insurance and Medicaid fraud. Fraud violations can result in
concurrent or subsequent federal sanctions, and state sanctions can be more serious
than their federal counterparts. 53
False Claims Acts
Prior to the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”) amendment, no state had a false
claims act with qui tam provisions. 54 Currently, 23 states and the District of Columbia
have adopted qui tam statutes. (Table 1). 55 Although modeled after the federal FCA,
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state false claims acts show some state-to-state variation. 56 Among states whose false
claims acts contain qui tam provisions, 17 states and the District of Columbia
incorporate these provisions into a general false claims law that does not solely target
Medicaid. California was the first state to adopt a qui tam statute, 57 and the California
law resembles the federal FCA, imposing liability for, among other acts, knowingly
presenting a false claim and conspiring to present a false claim. 58 New York’s false
claims act is also similar to the federal FCA; unlike the federal FCA, however, the New
York law specifically excludes local governments as well as the state government from
liability. 59
The remaining five states whose laws contain qui tam provisions have enacted
laws that are specific to the Medicaid program (see Table 1). 60 The Texas false claims
law includes prohibitions on knowingly or intentionally making false statements to obtain
Medicaid benefits, failing or concealing facts that affect the right to Medicaid, and
making false claims to Medicaid. 61 Nine additional states have general false claims acts
that do not contain qui tam provisions (Table 1).
The Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 62 incentivizes the state enactment of
false claims laws by permitting states to retain up to 10% of amounts that otherwise
would be repaid to the federal government in the event of a fraud recovery. 63 This
bounty provision works to incentivize states to “enact compliant false claims acts.” 64 In
order for a state to qualify for the FMAP recovery incentive, its false claims act must
meet the following requirements: (1) the law must establish “liability to the State for false
or fraudulent claims described in [the FCA] with respect to any expenditures related to
State Medicaid plans described in §1903(a) of the Act” 65 ; (2) the law must contain
“provisions that are at least as effective in rewarding and facilitating qui tam actions for
false or fraudulent claims as those described” in the FCA 66 ; (3) the law must contain “a
requirement for filing an action under seal for 60 days with review by the State Attorney
General;” 67 and (4) the law must contain “a civil penalty that is not less than the amount
of the civil penalty authorized under” the FCA. 68
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The HHS Office of the Inspector General reviews state false claims laws to
determine if the satisfy the FMAP reduction requirements. 69 Currently, OIG has
determined that 14 states have false claims acts that meet the DRA requirements
(Table 1). 70 Of the 10 states with the largest Medicaid populations, 71 6 have enacted
false claims acts meeting federal requirements. Florida’s law has not been deemed to
meet federal standards, and 3 states (North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) have
failed to enact legislation. 72 Figure 1.
Figure 1. False Claims Act Laws Meeting Federal Requirements
in the Ten Largest Medicaid States
California
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Michigan
New York
North
Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Texas

√
√
√
√

√

Anti Kickback Laws
Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have anti-kickback laws (Table
1). 73 These laws are either general in application or Medicaid specific. 74 State antikickback laws are “typically applicable to all payers” while the “federal anti-kickback
statute only applies to payments related to items and services provided under a federal
health care program.” 75 States’ anti-kickback statutes vary widely, are usually not
modeled after the federal law, and often lack the intent requirements of the federal
law. 76 Medicaid-specific anti-kickback laws, by contrast, typically are modeled after
federal law, although there can be variation, both among states and within a state, by
service. 77 State laws vary in the extent to which they include the types of safe harbor
69
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provisions found in the federal statute. 78 For example, the federal Anti-Kickback statute
exempts remunerations paid by an employer to a bone fide employee; 79 on the other
hand, Florida’s anti-kickback statute does not. 80 The relatively broad nature of many
state anti-kickback laws makes state level enforcement a “much easier pursuit requiring
less proof than would be needed to prove a violation of the federal statute.” 81 However,
at least one state court has held that a state anti-kickback law is preempted by federal
anti-kickback law. 82
Self-Referral Laws
Often referred to as “mini-Stark” laws, 83 thirty-four states have enacted laws
restricting self-referral by health care providers (Table1). 84 Laws vary by jurisdiction,
but in general they fall into three main categories: 1) laws that are nearly identical to
Stark laws applied to state programs; 2) laws that prohibit all self-referrals; and 3) laws
with a disclosure requirement of financial interests to patients. 85 In a number of cases,
state mini-Stark statutes simply incorporate the terms of the federal law by reference . 86
In the case of state laws that ban all self-referrals (thereby establishing standards
more stringent than the federal self-referral statute), physicians are banned from any
ownership interest in hospitals or other facilities to which they refer their patients. 87
State statutes requiring only disclosure vary widely across the states, but most require
disclosure in writing to the patient. 88
Whatever forms the state self-referral laws take, some state statutes may reach
self-referrals not covered by the federal prohibition. Of particular interest, state law may
extend to “referrals paid for by payors other than Medicare and Medicaid, referrals by
practitioners other than physicians, and referrals for services other than those
designated by the federal law.” 89 In contrast, other state laws are more flexible than the
Stark laws in providing broader exceptions to prohibitions on referrals. 90
State Oversight: Medicaid Fraud Control Units
State oversight of health care fraud has expanded considerably over the past two
decades, spurred on by the fraud problem and by federal reforms.
78
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The Medicaid and Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977 91
provide 90% matching funds over a three-year time period to states that established
Medicaid Fraud Abuse and Control Units (MFCUs) meeting certain requirements. 92 The
federal funding became permanent three years later, providing federal contributions of
90% toward the establishment of a MFCU and 75% federal contributions thereafter. 93
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 required each state to establish a
MCFU or obtain a waiver from the federal government. 94 Currently 49 states and the
District of Columbia have MFCUs; 95 only North Dakota operates without a MFCU and
with a federal waiver. 96
MFCUs are usually located within the office of the state Attorney General 97 and
have responsibility for both the detection and investigation of fraud and fraud
prosecution oversight. In addition, the MFCUs oversee instances of nursing home
abuse and fraud in program administration. 98 The MCFUs investigate their cases based
on local policies 99 and bring the cases in state courts using state laws. 100 Part of the
National Association of Attorneys General, the National Association of Medicaid Fraud
Control Units links the individual state MFCUs and seeks to “improve the quality of
Medicaid fraud investigations and prosecutions. 101

91

Medicaid and Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, Pub L No. 95-142.
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (2003). State Medicaid Fraud
Control Units Annual Report Fiscal Year 2003 1, available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/mfcu/MCFU2003.pdf. .
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
http://www.namfcu.net/states.
96
http://www.namfcu.net/about-us/about-mfcu.
97
Fleps, supra note 52 at Part 7 §2.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Blank SM, Kaspisin JA, White AC. (2009). Health Care Fraud, Am. Crim. L. Rev. 2009; 46:701, 757.
101
http://www.naag.org/medicaid_fraud.php.
92

Table 1: State Fraud Laws (2009)
State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

False Claims Act
9 FCA with qui tam
provisions
+ Act applies to
Medicaid Only
*meets DRA
requirements
• FCA without qui tam
+
9*
•
9
9
9
9+*
9*
9*
9*
•
9+
9*
9+*
9
•
9
•
9*
9
9
9
9*
•
9
•
9*
-

Anti Kickback Laws

Self-Referral Laws

9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

9
9
9
9
-

9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

State

False Claims Act
Self-Referral Laws
Anti Kickback Laws
9 FCA with qui tam
provisions
+ Act applies to
Medicaid Only
*meets DRA
requirements
• FCA without qui tam
9
Tennessee
9*
9
Texas
9+*
9
9
Utah
•
Vermont
9
9
Virginia
9*
9
9
Washington
•
9
9
West Virginia
9
9
Wisconsin
9+*
Wyoming
Total
239
37
34
9•
6+
14*
Source: Information on State Fraud Laws was obtained by a web-based search of CCH Health, Human
Resources, and Labor Database accessed July 29, 2009, and Fabrikant R, Kalb PE, Hopson MD, Bucy
PH (2002) Health Care Fraud, supra note 75 § 2.03.

How Widespread is Health Care Fraud and What Forms Does it Take?
As noted, fraud is both widespread and frequently associated with the health
care industry.
Estimates are that 80% of healthcare fraud is committed by medical providers,
10% by consumers, and the balance by others, such as insurers themselves and their
employees. 102 According to the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, the
majority of healthcare fraud is committed by dishonest providers. 103 The most common
types of provider fraud are:

102

•

billing for services that were never rendered; billing for more expensive services
or procedures than were actually provided or performed (“upcoding”);

•

performing medically unnecessary services solely for the purpose of generating
insurance payments;

•

misrepresenting non-covered treatments as medically necessary;

•

falsifying a patient’s diagnosis to justify tests, surgeries or other procedures that
aren’t medically necessary;

Coalition Against Insurance Fraud. Go Figure: fraud data. Available at
www.insurancefraud.org/stats.htm. Accessed on October 19, 2009.
103
National Healthcare Anti-Fraud Association, supra note 1.

•

billing a patient more than the co-pay amount for services that were prepaid;

•

accepting kickbacks for patient referrals;

•

waiving patient co-pays or deductibles;

•

over-billing the insurance carrier or benefit plan; 104 and

•

unbundling, that is, the practice of submitting bills in a fragmented fashion in
order to maximize the reimbursement for various tests or procedures that are
required to be billed together at a reduced cost. 105

Table 2 presents an illustrative overview of the types of fraudulent conduct that
have been pursued in court or reported in the press in recent years. These examples
have been drawn from a systematic search of reported actions using legal search
engines, as well as a review of legal journal and news articles on health care fraudrelated actions.
The types of fraud recovery actions described in Table 2 might be pursued
privately by health insurers as civil fraud cases, while, as noted, state Attorneys General
or the United States Department of Justice also have wide-ranging powers under state
and federal law to pursue health care fraud under numerous legal theories.
Table 2. Examples of Health Care Fraud across the Health Care Industry:
Private Health Insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid
Private Health Insurance

Medicare

Medicaid

Accused Company

Industry

Type of Fraud

UnitedHealth 106

Managed Care

McKesson 107

Pharmaceutical

Underpaid consumers (10%28%)
by
manipulating
database it used to pay
customers for out-of-network
services
Fraudulently inflated prices of
approximately 450 drugs
charged to insurers and
consumers

104

Recovery
(Year)
$350 million
(2008)

$350 million 108
(2009)

Id.
Federal Bureau of Investigations. Financial Crimes Report to the Public Fiscal Year 2007. Available
at: http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs_report2007/financial_crime_2007.htm#health.
106
American Medical Association v. United Healthcare Corp., 588 F.Supp.2d 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
107
New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund, et al. v. First DataBank, Inc. and McKesson Corp.,
244 F.R.D. 79 (D. Mass. August 27, 2007)
105

Accused Company

Industry

Type of Fraud

HealthNet 109

Managed Care

Cleveland Clinic 110
Tenet 111

Integrated Health Care
System
Hospital

ERISA and RICO violations
by underpaying consumers in
several states
Medical identity theft; false
claims
False claims, Kickbacks

TAP Pharmaceuticals 112

Pharmaceutical

False claims,
kickbacks

St. Barnabas Hospitals 113

Hospital

False claims

HCA 114

Hospital

False claims, kickbacks

HealthSouth 115

Rehabilitative Medicine
Services
Nursing Home

False claims

Ciena
Healthcare
Management, Inc. 116

108

Conspiracy,

False claims from inadequate
care
in
nutrition
and
hydration, the assessment
and evaluation of needs, care
planning
and
nursing
interventions,
medication
management, fall prevention,
and pressure ulcer care,
including the prevention and
treatment of wounds.

Recovery
(Year)
$215 million
(2006)
Unknown
$900 million
(2003)
$ 559.5 million
(2001)

$265 million
(2006)
$631 million
(2003)
$325 million
(2004)
$1.25 million 117
(2007)

This settlement is a preliminary court approved settlement entered on March 31, 2009 and the hearing
on final approval is scheduled for July 23, 2009. Available at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVpLVzpsq1NI.
109
Wachtel v. Health Net; McCoy v. Health Net; and Scharfman v. Health Net, 239 F.R.D. 81 (D. N.J.
December 6, 2006).
110
Ronrad W. A New Ailment: Medical ID Theft, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2009.
111
United States v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., C. A. No. 03-206 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2003).
112
United States ex rel. Durand v. TAP Pharmaceuticals, CA No. 00-12618-GAO (filed May 1996 in the
E.D. Pa., later transferred to D. Mass, settled Sept. 28, 2001).
113
United States ex rel. Monahan v. St. Barnabas Health Care System, Inc., C.A. No. 02-5702 (D.N.J.
June 15, 2006).
114
United States, ex. rel. Alderson, v. Columbia/HCA Corporation, Case No. 99-3290 (RCL), part of Case
No. 01-MS-50 (RCL) (D. D.C. 2003).
115
United States ex rel. James Devage v. HealthSouth Corporation, et al., Civ. Action No. SA-98-CA0372FB (W.D. Tex.).; United States ex rel. Manning v. HealthSouth Corporation, (W.D. Tex.); and United
States ex rel. Brupbacher & Associates and Michael C. Freeman v. National Institutional Pharmacy
Services, Inc. (D. N. Mex.) (cases settled Dec. 30 2004).
116
U.S. ex rel. Denise Hubbard v. Ciena Healthcare Management, et al., CV-03-60175 (E.D. Mich.).
117
This case involves fraud against both the Medicare and Medicaid programs.

Accused Company

Industry

Type of Fraud

United Health Group and
other insurers 118

Insurance

Amerigroup 119

Insurance/Managed
Care

Merck 120

Pharmaceutical

Serono Group 121
AstraZenica
Pharmaceuticals 122
Wyeth 123

Pharmaceutical

Fraud,
misrepresentation,
deception through use of
company-owned
Ingenix
system
to
systematically
undervalue
its
payment
obligations
for
physician
services in order to shift the
cost
of
out-of-network
coverage from the insurer to
members and plan sponsors
False claims involving the
treatment of pregnant women
and other patients
False claims,
Kickbacks
False claims, Kickbacks

Bristol-Meyers
Squibb 124 ,KV
Pharmaceuticals, Roxane
Laboratories,
Abbott
Laboratories,
Aventis
Pharmaceutical,
Teva
Pharmaceuticals, Schering
Plow/Warrick,
Forest
Laboratories,
Baxter
International,
Dey
Pharmaceuticals,
Bayer
Pharmaceuticals
Omnicare, Inc. 125

Pharmaceutical

False Claims

Pharmaceutical

False claims by replacing
brand-name with generic
drugs or switching dosage
strengths

118

Recovery
(Year)
Approximately
$100 million
(2009)

$225 million
(2007)
$650 million
(2006)
$567 million
$160 million
Qui tam action
pending
(2000 & 2009)
$123.75 million
(2009)

$49.5 million
(2006)

The American Medical Association v. United Healthcare Corporation, et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45610 (S.D.N.Y May 7, 2009).
119
United States, ex rel. Tyson, et al. v. Amerigroup Illinois, Inc., et al., 2007 WL 781729 (N.D.Ill. March
13, 2007).
120
State of Nevada ex rel. Steinke v. Merck & Company, Inc., 2006 WL 1506901(D. Nev. May 31, 2006).
121
United States ex rel. Driscoll v. Serono Laboratories,, Inc., C.A. No. 00-11680 (D. Mass. August 17,
2000).
122
Alabama v AstraZenica, [reported in] BNA, 18 Health Law Reporter (June 3, 2009).
123
United States. ex. Rel. Kieff v Wyeth, C.A. No. 03-12366DPW (D. Mass); USDOJ intervention May 18,
2009, [reported in] BNA Health Law Reporter 18:687 (June 3, 2009).
124
Alabama v Abbott Laboratories, No. CV-05-219 (Ala. Cir., Ct. May 22, 2009), [reported in] BNA Health
Law Reporter 18: 685 BNA) (June 3, 2009).
125
United States et al., ex rel. Bernard Lisitza v. Omnicare, Inc., 01 C 7433, and United States et al., ex
rel. David Kammerer v. Omnicare, Inc., 04 C 2074 (N.D. Il.).

Accused Company

Industry

Johns Hopkins Bayview
Medical Center 126

Hospital

Type of Fraud

False Claims Act (qui tam)21
by submitting false claims
about patients conditions that
had
not
been
actually
diagnosed or treated to
Medicare, Medicaid, and
TRICARE
Source: legal analysis of reported cases (Summer, 2009).

Recovery
(Year)
$2.75 million
(2009)

Provider Fraud: The Most Common Fraud
These cases suggest that the most common type of fraud involves systematically
overcharging both private and public insurers for the cost of items and services for
which payment is specified either by contract or in law. Thus, for example, many
pharmaceutical companies have been pursued by Medicaid programs for failing to
adhere to federal prescription drug rebate requirements, with resulting major
overcharges to state agencies. (Because the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services have not yet reported on cases of either improper payment or fraud under the
Medicare Part D program, 127 it is not possible to know the magnitude of such practices
under Medicare). Similarly, hospitals have been charged with systematically upcoding
Medicare claims to falsely elevate the cost of care. These cases underscore the fact
that these schemes depend on intimate knowledge of the health care business, the
ability to manipulate complex data, and having an insider status that comes with being a
health care provider. 128 The insurer fraud cases discussed below appear to be similarly
dependent on complex knowledge and insider status.
A review of cases through legal engine searches as well as review of legal
journals and news articles also suggests that the majority of fraud cases involve
providers. Important 2009 cases show this pattern:
• On July 10 2009, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan Terrence
Berg announced that Geoffrey Ramseur, a chiropractor who formerly practiced
in the Detroit area, was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment on healthcare
fraud charges, and ordered to pay $121,000 in restitution to Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Michigan (BC/BS-MI). 129 Ramseur pled guilty to submitting false
claims to BC/BS-MI for fictitious chiropractic services that were never actually
provided to patients. Ramseur admitted to engaging in this scheme over a twoyear period, and as part of that scheme, paying employees of Bing Steel and
126

United States, ex rel. Mayer v. Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center, D. Md., No. 1:07-cv-02011WDQ, (settlement announced 6/30/09).
127
GAO, Improper Payments: Progress Made, supra note 18.
128
Dixon P. The World Privacy Forum Report (2006). Medical Identity Theft: The Information Crime that
Can Kill You, Spring, p.36. Available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/wpf_medicalidtheft2006.pdf
129
United States Department of Justice, United States Attorney Eastern District of Michigan Press
Release, July 10, 2009. Florida Resident Sentenced on Health Care Fraud Charges. Available at:
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/mie/press/2009/2009-7-10_gramseur.pdf.

other large factories in the Detroit area to use their Social Security numbers
and BC/BS-MI identification numbers. 130
• Joby George, a pharmacist and part-owner of a pharmacy in Greenwich,
Connecticut, pled guilty to knowingly submitting false claims to the Medicaid
and Medicare programs over a two-year period. 131 According to plea
documents, George submitted various claims to Medicaid for prescription
drugs that were not actually dispensed to Medicaid recipients, and also claims
for certain brand name drugs when, in fact, he dispensed less expensive
generic drugs. In addition, George admitted to submitting claims to Medicare
for certain prescription narcotics that he dispensed to an individual while
accepting cash payments from that individual for additional quantities of those
drugs. George entered into a civil settlement with the federal government
under which he agreed to pay $344,805 in restitution to the Medicare and
Medicaid program.
• Also in 2009, Sam Smith Hill III, a licensed psychologist who formerly practiced
in Corpus Christi, Texas, was sentenced to five years’ probation and six
months’ house arrest for defrauding the Medicaid program out of more than
$48,000. 132 During trial, the federal government showed that Hill billed
Medicaid for psychological testing conducted by individuals with Master level
degrees in psychology whom he hired to give the tests. In submitting claims to
Medicaid, however, Hill falsely indicated that he had conducted the testing
himself, and used the CPT billing procedure code for testing by licensed
psychologists. At sentencing, Hill also was ordered to pay $48,739 in
restitution to Medicaid and a $40,000 fine. 133
• On July 14, 2009, New Jersey Attorney General Anne Milgram announced that
Dr. Khashayar Salartash, a surgeon, his office manager Farah Iranipour
Houtan, and the treatment center they owned were indicted on charges of
defrauding the Medicare and Medicaid programs as well as various private
insurance companies out of more than $8.5 million. 134 According to the
indictment, over a five-year period Salartash and Houtan, through their medical
center specializing in the treatment of lymphedema, submitted false claims to
130

Id.
United States Attorney’s Office District of Connecticut Press Release, July 10, 2009. Pharmacist
Pleads Guilty To Health Care Fraud, Agrees To Pay $344,085 To Settle False Claims Act Allegations.
Available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ct/Press2009/20090710.html.
132
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Stop Health Care Fraud, In the News. Two Houston
Area Doctors Charged in Conspiracy to Illegally Distribute Narcotics and Medicare/Medicaid Fraud (U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of Texas). July 20, 2009. Available at:
http://www.hhs.gov/stopmedicarefraud/innews.html.
133
Id.
134
The State of New Jersey, Department of Law and Public Safety, Office of the Attorney General Press
Release, July 14, 2009. Atlantic County Surgeon, Manager, and Treatment Center charged in $8.5
Million Fraud against Medicare, Medicaid and Private Insurers. Available at:
http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases09/pr20090714b.html.
131

Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers that indicated Salartash had either
personally provided services or directly supervised licensed personnel who
rendered services, when in fact, the services were often performed by a
physical therapist or nurse with no supervision. In addition, Salartash and
Houtan allegedly billed for surgery when only physical therapy services were
rendered, and for services performed in an outpatient hospital facility when the
procedures were performed in a physician’s office. 135
• Six individuals—Alexander Levy, Zona Castellano, Aaron Bethea, Leonid
Skylar, Yelena Bogatyrov, and Arthur Gutman, along with seven
corporations—were indicted on charges of being involved in an elaborate fraud
scheme that bilked the Medicaid program out of $47 million over a 10-year
period, announced New York Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo on July
16. 136 Levy, the ringleader, was excluded from participation in the Medicaid
program in 1997 for submitting false claims for medically unnecessary and/or
never provided services. Nonetheless, Levy set up a series of corporations
structured to hide his control and ownership interests in a home healthcare
agency, two ambulette companies, and three medical clinics, all of which billed
Medicaid for millions of dollars of services. 137
There are unusual instances in which patients themselves appear to be part of
the scheme, but by far the more common scenario involves the buying of patient
information without patient knowledge.

135

•

On June 24, 2009, the United States Department of Justice indicted fifty-three
people, including physicians, healthcare executives, medical assistants, and
Medicare beneficiaries themselves for their alleged involvement in several
schemes to submit more than $50 million in false Medicare claims.138
According to the indictments, the defendants were charged with participated
in schemes to submit claims to Medicare for phantom and unnecessary
treatments, with Medicare beneficiaries accepting cash kickbacks in return for
allowing providers to submit forms saying they had received the unnecessary
and not provided treatments. 139

•

In United States v. Ferrer, Southern District of Florida, On January 24, 2007,
a federal jury convicted a defendant in a case involving the theft and transfer
of Medicare patient information from the Cleveland Clinic in Weston, Florida.

Id.
State of New York, Office of Attorney General Press Release, July 16, 2009. Fraudulent Medicaid
Provider Allegedly Developed an Elaborate Financial Web to Steal from Medicaid and Launder the
Proceeds. Available at: http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/july/july16c_09.html.
137
Id.
138
United States Department of Justice. Press Release #09-623 Wednesday June 24, 2009. Medicare
Fraud Strike Force Operations Lead to Charges Against 53 Doctors, Health Care Executives and
Beneficiaries for More Than $50 Million in Alleged False Billing in Detroit. Available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-623.html
139
Id.
136

The defendant purchased the patient information from a co-defendant, a
former Cleveland Clinic employee, who pled guilty on January 12, 2007 and
testified against the defendant at trial. The theft resulted in the submission of
more than $7 million in fraudulent Medicare claims, with approximately $2.5
million paid to providers and suppliers. 140
•

In California, unscrupulous medical providers were buying Medi-Cal and
Medicare patient identity numbers and were using them to get reimbursed for
millions of dollars in tests and other services that were never provided. Of $34
billion annually spent by the Medi-Cal program for health care for
approximately 7 million Californians, state officials estimate that as much as
$14 billion in expenditures relate to similar fraudulent scenarios. 141

•

A 2009 GAO study reported fraudulent beneficiary conduct in relation to
controlled substances. In California, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, and
Texas about 65,000 Medicaid beneficiaries (1% of the Medicaid population of
these five states) acquired the same type of controlled substance from six or
more different medical practitioners (known as doctor shopping) during fiscal
years 2006-2007. Some 400 beneficiaries were found to have visited
between 21 to 112 medical practitioners to obtain the same controlled
substances, a pattern that according to GAO implies drug addiction and
fraudulent behavior. 142

Private Health Insurer Fraud: An Important Added Dimension
Some of the most striking examples of fraud are those that involve the private
health insurance industry itself. In these cases, the deception can involve either
overstating the insurer’s costs in paying claims, or systematically and deceptively undervaluing the amounts owed by the insurer to a health care provider under the terms of its
contract. The result is to shift increased responsibility for the cost of care to the plan
member and group sponsor, thereby avoiding the insurer’s obligations under the terms
of its contract:
•

140

In 2009, UnitedHealth, a leading insurance company, paid $350 million to
settle lawsuits brought by the American Medical Association and other
physician groups for shortchanging consumers and physicians for medical
services outside its preferred network.143 Under the United insurers’ health
plans, members pay a higher premium for the right to use out-of-network

http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_opa_278.html.
Testimony of Pam Dixon, Executive Director, World Privacy Forum. Electronic Health Records and the
National Health Information Network: Patient Choice, Privacy, and Security in Digitized Environments
Before The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) Subcommittee on Privacy and
Confidentiality San Francisco, California. Tuesday, August 16, 2005.
142
GAO. Medicaid: Fraud and Abuse Related to Controlled Substances Identified in Selected States.
(GAO-09-957) (September 2009).
143
The American Medical Association v. United Healthcare Corporation, et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45610 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2009).
141

doctors. In exchange, the insurers promise to cover up to 80% of either the
doctor’s full bill or of the “reasonable and customary” rate depending upon
which is cheaper. The Attorney General’s investigation found that by
distorting the “reasonable and customary” rate, the United insurers were able
to keep their reimbursements artificially low and force patients to absorb a
higher share of the costs. This intentional manipulation of provider payments
resulted in an estimated 10% to 28% increase in members’ direct financial
exposure for the cost of out-of-network care. 144
•

Humana and its affiliated private insurer was found to have intentionally
misrepresented the size of its hospitals’ bills to employer-sponsored plan
members, thereby causing members to pay amounts for their own care that
vastly exceeded the 20% copays they legally owed. Humana secretly
negotiated deep discounts with its own member hospitals. As a result, plan
members were actually paying the majority of the hospital bills they incurred
rather than the 20% copay they were promised. 145

Reported Cases in States with Large Medicaid Populations
Table 3 represents similar patterns of health care fraud within the states with the
ten largest Medicaid populations again showing that the majority of cases come from
providers, not beneficiaries and are distributed among Medicaid, Medicare and private
insurance markets alike.
Table 3: Health Care Fraud among States with the
Ten Largest Medicaid Populations*
State
California

Insurance
Market
Medicaid

Company

Industry

Type of Fraud

City of Angels Medical
Center,
Vice
President 146
Blue
Cross
of
California 147

Hospital

False
kickbacks

Managed Care

false claims

Medicaid

WellCare 148

Managed Cared

Medicare

University
MRI
&
Diagnostic
Imaging
Centers 149
King
Pharmaceuticals 150

Radiology

False
claims,
conspiracy
False
claims,
kickbacks

Medicare
Florida

Georgia

144

Medicaid

Pharmaceutical

claims,

False claims

Recovery
(Year)
$4.1 million
(2009)
$9.25
million
(2002)
$80 million
(2009)
$7 million
(2008)
$3.5 million
(2007)

Id.
Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999); 119 S. Ct. 710; 142 L. Ed. 2d 753.
146
The fraud concerned both Medicaid and Medicare.
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pressroom/pr2009/007.html
147
United States of America, ex rel. Vipul Vaid v. Blue Cross of California; Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc.
148
United States v. WellCare Health Plans Inc.
149
United States ex rel. David Clayman v. University MRI and Fred Steinberg.
145

State

Insurance
Market
Medicaid

Company
Condell
Network 151

Medicare

Condell
Network

Michigan

Medicaid

New York

Illinois

North Carolina

Ohio

Pennsylvania

Industry

Type of Fraud

Health

Hospital

False claims

Health

Hospital

False Claims

OmniCare 152

Pharmaceutical

False
claims,
racketeering

Medicaid

HealthFirst 153

Managed Care

False
claims,
scheme to defraud,
falsifying business
records

Medicare

Staten
Island
University Hospital 154

Hospital

False claims

Medicaid

Medicaid
Center 156

Dentist

False claims by
billing for medically
unnecessary
services

Private

Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of NC 157

Managed Care

RICO

Medicaid

Warrick
Pharmaceuticals 158

Pharmaceutical

Private

United Health 159

Managed Care

Medicaid

Schering-Plough
Corporation 160
Pennsylvania
Blue
Plan Highmark Inc. 161

Pharmaceutical

fraud,
unjust
enrichment
and
violation
of
consumer
protection laws
Collusion in paying
artificially
low
reimbursements to
physicians
False claims

Managed Care

RICO

Private

150

Dental

Recovery
(Year)
$2.88
million
(2008)
$33.12
million
(2008)
$52.5
million
(2006)
$35 million
(2008)

$25
million 155
(2008)
$10 million
(2008)

$8.59
million
(2009)
$4.3 million
(2009)

$44.5
million
(2006)
$7.8 million
(2004)
$10 million
(2007)

Part of a nationwide settlement. U.S. ex rel. Bogart v. King Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Condell Health Network made a voluntary disclosure of its violations in order to avoid a FCA lawsuit.
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/pr1201_01a.pdf.
152
Michigan v. Specialized Pharmacy Services (Omnicare Inc.)
153
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/sep/sep3a_08.html.
154
United States and New York State ex rel. Tirado v. Staten Island University Hospital.
155
Part of a global settlement against the hospital for defrauding several government programs.
156
United States v. Michael DeRose d/b/a Medicaid Dental Center.
157
Part of a nationwide settlement. Rick Love, M.D., et al., v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association, et al.
158
http://www.ag.state.oh.us/press/09/05/pr090528.asp.
159
Aetna settle earlier for $22 million. Academy of Medicine of Cincinnati, et al. v. Aetna, et al.
160
Part of a nationwide settlement. United States v. Schering-Plough Corp.
161
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07334/837893-28.stm System
151

State
Texas

Insurance
Market
Medicaid

Company

Industry

Type of Fraud

Abbott Labs 162

Pharmaceutical

False claims

Recovery

$28 million
(2006)
Medicare
Methodist
Hospital, Hospital
False claims
$10 million
Houston 163
(2009)
Source: Legal cases found from health fraud search on LexisNexis. State Medicaid enrollment data found
at Kaiser Family Foundation, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=198&cat=4.

Anti-Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Efforts
Anti-fraud efforts have met with considerable success. The legislative expansion
of anti-fraud law and its active enforcement have led to an increase in convictions and
recoveries especially in the case of public health insurance programs, as well as to an
increase in funding for implementation and creation of anti-fraud programs and task
forces.
HIPAA established a potentially far-reaching Health Care Fraud and Abuse
Control Program. 164 The program, covering fraud and abuse in both publicly and
privately sponsored health insurance, resulted in approximately $1.8 billion in judgments
and settlements in FY 2007. 165 The expansion of existing Medicaid anti-fraud activities
under the Deficit Reduction Act also has resulted in improved Medicaid fraud
recoveries. 166
According to the Office of the Inspector General’s semiannual report to Congress
(Spring 2009), the government’s enforcement efforts resulted in 222 criminal actions
and 239 civil actions against individuals or entities engaged in health-care-related
offenses. 167 These efforts resulted in $1.6 billion in HHS recoveries, and $540.8 million
in non-HHS investigative receivables, including civil and administrative settlements or
civil judgments related to Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal, state, and private
health care programs. 168 The report also anticipates more than $2.4 billion in expected
recoveries for the first half of 2009. 169
Another important effort is the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement
Action Team (HEAT) initiative, which is designed to reduce Medicare and Medicaid
fraud. Since its inception in March 2007, with a first phase in South Florida and a
second phase expansion in Los Angeles, the Strike Force has obtained indictments of
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more than 250 individuals and organizations that collectively have billed the Medicare
program for more than $600 million. 170 In addition, HHS’s Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, working in conjunction with the HHS-OIG, has taken additional steps
to increase accountability and decrease the presence of fraudulent providers.
The Department of Justice secured $1.34 billion in settlements and judgments in
the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2008, pursuing allegations of fraud against the federal
government. 171 Notably, this brings total recoveries since 1986, when Congress
substantially strengthened the federal False Claims Act, to more than $21 billion. As in
the last several years, health care accounted for the lion's share of fraud settlements
and judgments, more than $1.1 billion. 172 This number includes both qui tam claims as
well as claims initiated by the United States. The Department of Health and Human
Services achieved the largest recoveries, largely attributable to Medicare and Medicaid
recoveries. In fiscal year 2008, state Medicaid Fraud Control Units recovered more than
$1.3 billion and obtained 1,314 convictions. 173 Recoveries were also made by the Office
of Personnel Management which administers the Federal Employees Health Benefits
Program, the Department of Defense for its TRICARE insurance program, the
Department of Veterans Affairs and others. 174
Table 4 shows the past decade of fraud recoveries. As the table indicates,
Medicaid recoveries have increased as the laws have been toughened. As the impact of
the 2006 and 2009 reforms are seen, and greater public policy attention to fraud grows,
these recovery figures can be expected to increase still further.
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Table 4. Federal Health Care Fraud and Abuse Program Recoveries by Fiscal
Year. 175
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http://www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/hcfac.asp.

Conclusion
Fraud – whether committed by health care providers, plan members, or insurers
themselves – is an unfortunate but real part of the health care landscape. Medicare and
Medicaid may be susceptible to fraud in part because many investigative reports on
victims of consumer swindles suggest that financial fraud is not uniformly distributed
across all households; instead, it disproportionately targets the elderly, women,
minorities, the less educated, and the poor. 176 Furthermore, laws aimed at curbing fraud
provide for extensive public reporting in the case of public insurance programs, a
requirement that is not applicable to private insurers unless required to do so under
state law.
An extensive body of fraud law exists; nonetheless overcoming fraud will remain
a key challenge. The importance of continuing to strengthen these laws is reflected in
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the fact that both the House and Senate health reform legislation focus on the issue.
Important ongoing efforts to reduce fraud include extending the reach and scope of the
HIPAA insurance fraud provisions of 1996 and assuring transparent reporting across all
forms of coverage, including public insurance, private health insurance, and employer
sponsored health plans. In addition, while a focus on provider fraud remains crucial,
evidence drawn from recent prosecutions and court decisions emphasizes the
importance of focusing on insurer fraud as well, including marketing and enrollment
fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation of the terms of coverage and payment, provider
payment fraud, violation of consumer protection laws, and other forms of conduct that
may allow insurers to amass and wrongfully manipulate billions of dollars in government
and private premium payments. Finally, sufficient funds must be allocated to federal
and state oversight agencies in order to assure that cases of fraud are effectively
detected and addressed.

